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Background: In the transition from a planned economy to a market-oriented economy, China’s state funding for
health care declined and traditional coverage plans collapsed, leaving China’s poor exposed to potentially ruinous
health care costs. In reforming health care for the 21st century, equity in health care financing has become a major
policy goal. To assess progress towards this goal, this paper examines the equity characteristics of health care
financing in a province of northwestern China, comparing the equity performance between urban and rural areas
at two different points in time.
Methods: Analysis of whether health care financing contributions were progressive according to income were
made using the Kakwani index for each of the four health care financing channels of general taxes, public and
private health insurance, and out-of-pocket payments. Two rounds of surveys were conducted, the first in 2003
(13,619 individuals in 3946 households) and the second in 2008 (12,973 individuals in 3958 households). Household
socio-economic, health care payment, and utilization information were recorded in household interviews.
Results: Low-income households have undertaken a larger share of the health care financing burden in recent
years, reflected by negative Kakwani indices, which indicate a regressive system. We found that the indices for
general taxation were −0.0024 (urban) and −0.0281 (rural) in 2002, and −0.0177 (urban) and −0.0097 (rural) in 2007.
Public health insurance presented different financing distributions in urban and rural areas (urban: 0.0742 in 2002,
0.0661 in 2007; rural: –0.0615 in 2002,–0.1436 in 2007.). Out-of-pocket payments were progressive but not equitable.
Public health insurance coverage has expanded but financing equity has decreased.
Conclusions: Health care financing policies in China need ongoing reform. Given the inequity of general
consumption taxes, elimination of these would improve financing equity considerably. Optimizing benefit packages
in public health insurance is as important as expanding coverage, both for health care financing and for utilization
management as well. Although they are progressive, out-of-pocket payments are not equitable in China and have
the effect of excluding the poor from health care as they cannot afford to pay for medical care and so withdraw
from treatment.
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Questions always follow health care reform. Is the re-
form designed to improve equity? If so, does it work?
To make health care reform sustainable through finan-
cial support and acceptable to a majority of the public,
policy-makers and researchers prefer that a health care
system should be renovated at the starting point. Conse-
quently, financing equity has been set up as one major
policy goal in health care reform across a number of
countries [1-3]. In a health care system, equitable finan-
cing mechanisms play a significant role in promoting
health care access and achieving universal coverage of
health services, especially for the poor and vulnerable
groups [4-7]. It is widely recognized that health care
payments should be set equally according to household
ability-to-pay (ATP) [8,9]. Therefore, the evaluation of
financing equity is a fundamental study for judging
whether health care reform is sound or not, for explor-
ing existing flaws in health funding channels, and most
importantly, for finding effective countermeasures to
improve deficiencies. The distribution of health care
financing has been researched both at an international
level, based on equity performance comparisons among
continents and countries, and at a national level, focused
on the variable equity status of unequal socioeconomic
groups [10-13]. However, no quantitative evaluation of
the distribution of the health care financing burden in
the country of China has been conducted. This paper
seeks to address this gap by an equity appraisal study of
Gansu, one province in China. Moreover, in contrast to
earlier studies on health care financing in one particular
period, two sets of data for this study were collected
from different years. This allows deliberate consideration
of not only whether equity of health care financing in a
specific year from any panel of data is sound, but
whether the health care financing system is making pro-
gress in the evolution of the health care reform in China
as well.
Influenced by economic reforms since the 1980s, China’s
health care system experienced a huge transformation
from a planned economic pattern to a market-oriented
model. Along with decentralization of financial responsibil-
ity for managing health care, state funding for health care
declined rapidly. As a result, the proportion of public
financing in the health care system decreased while the
share of private financing increased [14,15]. In the early
1990s, healthcare insurances collapsed, such as the shrink-
ing of the Government Welfare Insurance Scheme (GWIS)
and the Labor Insurance Scheme (LIS) in urban areas, and
the breakup of the Cooperative Medical System (CMS)
[16,17]. At the same time, because of the above reasons,
financing mechanisms came to primarily rely on out-of-
pocket payments (OOP) for health care service [18,19].
This transformation greatly changed China’s health carefinancing structure. Between 1990 and 2002, the percent-
age of government spending for health dropped from
25.06% to 15.69%; over the same period, the percentage of
public health insurance spending dropped from 39.19% to
19.14%. Conversely, the proportion of OOP payments rose
sharply from 35.73% to 57.72% [20]. Consequently, heavy
reliance on direct payment resulted in financial difficul-
ties in access to health care, and led to a tiered and
segmented health financing system, disproportionately
providing health care to the poor and marginalized
groups. From 1993 to 2003, the proportion of the popu-
lation who could not afford outpatient medical treat-
ment rose from 32% to 36% in urban areas and from
32% to 39% in rural areas [21]. The average cost of a
single hospital admission is more than twice the aver-
age annual income of the lowest 20% of the population
in China [22]. The aged population in low income
groups tended not to use inpatient services [23].
Confronted with such a situation, growing attention has
been given to equity, especially after the recommendation
of the World Health Report 2000 which implied that
China has a most inequitable health care system. The
achievement of financing equity has become the health
policy thrust in health care innovation. Since 2003, China
has been launching health sector reform gradually and
implementing a specific policy package. In particular, this
package incorporates innovation in health care financing,
such as: an increase in government health input, the intro-
duction of new types of health insurance (known as the
Urban Resident Basic Medical Insurance Scheme and the
New Rural Cooperative Medical Scheme), and an expan-
sion in health insurance coverage for the uninsured. These
policies aim to reduce the share of OOP health payments
through increasing the proportion of government health
spending and health insurance funding [24].
Since then, China has established a multi-level health
care financing system step by step for the urban and
rural populations, in an attempt to make significant
progress in the equitable distribution of health care
funding. In Table 1, the percentage of total expenditure
on health (TEH) financed from each of the main sources
between 2002 and 2007 is presented. Like most health
care financing systems, China’s system draws revenues
from four sources: general taxes, public health insurance,
private insurance and OOP payments.
General taxes
Taxation is a stable resource among health care finan-
cing channels, especially in developing and underdevel-
oped countries. In China, the government budget for
health is an important part of the financial resources at
all levels of government spending, being mainly financed
through a variety of tax revenues. No earmarked health
taxes exist in China. The revenue mainly comes from
Table 1 The porportions of health care financing











2002 15.69 15.64 2.09 57.72 8.86
2003 16.96 14.78 3.68 55.87 8.70
2004 17.04 16.31 3.39 53.64 9.63
2005 17.93 15.99 3.55 52.21 10.33
2006 18.07 17.55 3.83 49.31 11.24
2007 22.31 21.28 3.32 44.05 9.05
Data source: China Health Economic Institute.
*Others mainly refers to donation revenue, recurrent expenses of medical-aid,
and health administration fees.
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sonal income taxes, corporate taxes, property taxes, and
agricultural taxes in China, while indirect taxes include
the value-added tax (VAT), excise taxes, and sales taxes.
The taxes above are allocated to all forms of qualified indi-
viduals, regardless of whether they are the rich or the
poor. Tax revenue is turned over as part of the state finan-
cial income, a portion of which is dedicated to health care
financing system as the government budget on health. Tax
financing usually refers to a pay-as-you-go arrangement,
where current revenues are used to finance current expen-
ditures. Generally, the rich pay more taxes than the poor
in absolute terms. However, it doesn’t mean that tax fund-
ing is always the progressive channel that is preferred by
the poor. For instance, the payroll tax, sales tax and
cigarette tax are regressive in that the tax rate decreases as
the amount subject to taxation increases. In other words,
a regressive tax imposes a greater burden on the poor than
on the rich. On the contrary, a progressive tax implies that
the rich bear more burden than the poor, such as with
individual income taxes. In China, the amount financed
by taxes is rising steadily, from 15.69% in 2002 to 22.31%
in 2007.
Public health insurance
Public health insurance plays a significant role in the
health care financing system. Owing to the dual structure
of urban–rural areas in China, two national health insur-
ance schemes have been formed separately. These are the
urban health insurance called Basic Medical Insurance
(BMI) in cities and counties [25], and the rural health
insurance known as the New Rural Cooperative Medical
Care System (NCMS) in towns and villages.
The Urban Workers Basic Medical Insurance (UWBMI),
the initiation of BMI, was officially launched at the end of
1998 and is run by the local government that organizes
universal health insurance for urban formal-sector workers.
The premium is funded jointly by employers and employ-
ees, while the funding amount depends on the individual’s
age. Generally, employers provide 6-8% of employees’salaries for urban workers under the age of 45 and provide
8-10% of the salaries for those aged 45 or above. The
employees themselves contribute around 2% of their salar-
ies [26]. Two measures have been adopted in the ongoing
health care reform process to update BMI. First, coverage
of the population by UWBMI was expanded by almost
14% from 30.4% in 2002 to 44.2% in 2007 [21,27]. In the
reform, not only the workers in state-owned and collective
enterprises are insured by BMI, but BMI also covers
migrant workers and employees working in private enter-
prises, foreign-invested enterprises, social organizations,
private non-enterprise units, etc. Second, a new type of
BMI, named the Urban Resident Basic Medical Insurance
scheme (URBMI), has been carried out for the 420
million urban residents not covered by UWBMI [28].
Target groups for the new scheme are urban residents
such as students, children, the elderly, the non-
employed and the disabled. The new urban scheme is
financed largely by the family as a unit with appropri-
ate subsidies granted by government [29]. The finan-
cing contribution from households accounts for 64%
of the total URBMI premium, around 80–120 RMB
per capita per annum [30]. All in all, the core of BMI
renovation is the expansion of coverage.
The New Rural Cooperative Medical Scheme (NCMS)
is a 2003 initiative to rebuild rural health insurance after
the collapse of CMS in the 1990s and to overhaul the
health care system in villages. NCMS is a voluntary pro-
gram that covers only those who join; it has maintained a
high level of coverage of the population, increasing from
75.20% in 2004 to 86.20% in 2007. NCMS is funded by
equal contributions from every enrollee and by increas-
ingly generous subsidies from central and local govern-
ments. NCMS operates at the county rather than the
commune level and hence has a much larger risk pool.
Finally, NCMS focuses in most localities largely on the
costs of inpatient care rather than those of basic medical
services which include personal and communal preventive
interventions. The premium and reimbursement rate
grow steadily every year. Generally, the coinsurance has
lowered and the medical services covered by NCMS have
increased year by year.
Private health insurance
In China, private health insurance is at the initial stage
without a clear direction. Access to commercial health
insurance is highly correlated to economic status and
personal awareness of the insurance. The insured also
need to consider how much to purchase according
to their income. In addition, the premiums paid by
lower income groups are only slightly lower than those
charged to higher income groups. Private health insur-
ance plays a minor role in health care payments, around
3% of the total health care financing amount.
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OOP payments are those expenditures that individuals
must pay directly to the health care provider without
any compensation to the patients. As the complemen-
tary mechanism to the other financing channels, the
OOP payment has been robust since the 1980s in China,
to improve the efficiency and quality of the health care
system. However, it has become the main source of the
Chinese health care financing system (Table 1). With
cost escalation in health care and heavy reliance on
OOP payments, paying for health care has become a
notable cause of impoverishment for households that
lack adequate health insurance. More than 35% of urban
households and 43% of rural households have difficulty
affording health care, go without, or are impoverished by
the costs [31]. Although no effort has been spared in
aiming to reduce the share of direct payment in health
care reform, the OOP payment still accounts for the
largest proportion of the total health care financing
amount in China. Evidence has shown that two essential
outcomes would be created by the high OOP payments:
no seeking of medical care because of economic hard-
ship and catastrophic health expenses accumulated if
treatment is continued [32].
However, it is hard to evaluate the impact of health
care reform and difficult to explore the effect of the
changes in health care financing system pre- and post-
reform, especially because of the lack of empirical evi-
dence about the actual degree of inequalities associated
with the health care financing mechanisms in China.
Meanwhile, it would be difficult to find faults in health
care financing practice because they come under the
auspices of the “hoped-for health care reform”. More-
over, the change and variation in the extent of equalities
across years and regions have not been reviewed in pre-
vious studies, and this would shed light on the positive
or negative effect of health care financing heavily influ-
enced by the measures in the reform. These issues raise
questions for policy makers and researchers on how to
assess equity in health care reform to prove whether the
equity target has been achieved or not.
The paper begins by presenting China’s health care
finance within which the Chinese health policies were
developed, illuminating the specific measures of health
financing implemented by health care reform, and iden-
tifying some key issues to be considered in its evaluation.
The next section provides the method used in the
assessment of health care financing; more specifically, it
outlines how empirical results in urban–rural areas and
different times were compared. Data about socioeco-
nomic and health status from the national health investi-
gation are then critically analyzed and evaluated. The
final section attempts to draw some conclusions in rela-
tion to broad lessons from the Chinese experience.Methods
Data
The data for the analysis came from two rounds of
household surveys in Gansu province, China. The two
rounds were conducted in 2003 and 2008 in the
sampling regions, recording the information in 2002
and 2007, respectively. Gansu province, located in the
northwest of China, is one of the impoverished pro-
vinces with more than 26 million people. Adopting a
multi-stage stratified random sampling method, the
survey randomly selected 15 cities or counties. In every
city or county, 8 communities or villages were selected
by economic level and geographic distribution. Then 33
households were randomly selected from the communi-
ties or villages. Finally, 3946 households with 13619
individuals in the year 2003 and 3958 households with
12973 individuals in the year 2008 were effectively
collected in the survey. Permission was obtained from
all individuals who were enrolled in our study after read-
ing through the consent forms. Table 2 presents detailed
data about some descriptive and social-economics charac-
teristics in each income quintile.
The survey contains extensive information about house-
hold socio-economic and demographic characteristics,
including gross household income, urban–rural classifica-
tion, number of family members, sex, age, education
attainment, and working status of household members,
household goods, and consumption. With regard to
household expenditure, monthly expenditure on food,
clothing, traffic, communication, housing, water, electri-
city, fuel, education, travel, entertainment, medical care
and other expenditures were recorded in the survey. In
addition, information on unexpected expenditures in the
previous year was also collected. Concerning health care
payment, information was computed through two sources
of data: one was gathered from the survey above, and the
other data were mainly tariffs for taxes and copayments
for public health insurance, which were collected from the
local statistics yearbook. Specifically, taxes considered in
our study include the cigarette tax, alcohol tax, amuse-
ment tax, electricity and gas tax, excise on eating, drinking
and lodging, and other consumption taxes. These taxes
were approximated by applying specific tax rates to the
corresponding expenditures. The private health insurance
payment was directly obtained from the survey. The
inquiry into out-of-pocket payment involved information
about health care expenditures on prescription, outpatient
and inpatient care paid by individuals during the latest
2 weeks before the household interview. Health care
utilization information on outpatient visits and lengths of
hospital stays was also collected in the interview. The
study was funded by the Ministry of Health, People’s
Republic of China, which agreed to the use of these data
for academic research.




Nb of families surveyed Nb of individuals surveyed Annual household expenditure a Insurance rate (%)
urban rural urban rural urban rural urban rural
2002 Q1 394 394 1243(21.14%) 1609(20.79%) 3495.50(69.38*) 1722.95(38.00) 5.31 7.61
Q2 395 390 1275(21.68%) 1538(19.87%) 6389.32(96.36) 3200.49(43.63) 17.22 8.09
Q3 396 403 1211(20.60%) 1608(20.78%) 9160.73(122.70) 4351.83(53.47) 27.53 6.87
Q4 394 391 1105(18.79%) 1558(20.13%) 12593.67(163.37) 5714.12(73.02) 41.85 12.81
Q5 395 394 1046(17.79%) 1426(18.43%) 28552.80(1464.54) 14375.75(2346.13) 48.47 13.21
total 1974 1972 5880 7739 12040.99(15839.00) 5871.69(21286.48) 27.07 9.60
2007 Q1 395 395 1217(21.81%) 1567(21.20%) 7017.00(129.81) 3360.84(66.03) 70.67 95.41
Q2 397 397 1215(21.77%) 1574(21.29%) 11024.56(153.47) 5464.46(74.36) 70.10 92.12
Q3 396 395 1126(20.18%) 1489(20.14%) 14496.86(220.37) 7058.36(102.88) 71.31 93.28
Q4 396 398 1031(18.47%) 1474(19.94%) 18998.99(279.67) 9591.37(136.69) 78.47 95.52
Q5 395 394 992(17.77%) 1288(17.42%) 30941.74(696.17) 15993.42(392.00) 82.28 96.20
total 1979 1979 5581 7392 16506.67(10922.06) 8288.91(5835.67) 74.18 94.44
Data source: Author’s calculations from the sample of household survey.
a All expenditures are presented in CNY.
*Standard error.
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In our study, the unit of analysis was the household.
Gross income and health financing contributions are
aggregated to the household level. The value of house-
hold expenditure was used as the measurement of living
standard. Adjustment is made for the size and age struc-
ture of the household through application of an equiva-
lence scale to both ATP and each component of health
financing. The scale used is
AE ¼ Aþ 0:5Kð Þ0:75
where A is the number of adults in the household and
K the number of children (0–14 years) [33].
Although there are many different methods to calcu-
late the equity of health care financing, the approach in
our study was to employ progressivity to measure the
extent of equity. The progressivity of a health care finan-
cing system refers to the extent to which health care
payments rise as a proportion of a household’s income
when the latter rises. Specifically, we use the Kakwani
index of progressivity to calculate the extent of the
equity of the health care financing system [34-36].
Figure 1 displays the conceptual cumulative concen-
tration curve for health care payments and income of
household. The Lorenz curve for gross income (Linc)
represents the relationship between the cumulative per-
centage of income and the cumulative percentage of the
households in population (the households are ranked
according to their income, Lcum), while the concentra-
tion curve for health care payments (Lpay) displays the
cumulative healthcare share of payments against thecumulative percentage of the households in population.
The Kakwani index of progressivity of health care pay-
ments on gross income, is defined by twice the area
between the Lorenz curve for gross income (Linc) and
















Lcum  Linc½ dp
πk ¼ C  G
where C is the concentration index (CI) of health care
payments, defined as the distribution of health care fi-
nancing contributions across the population ranked by
gross income and G refers to the Gini coefficient of
gross income. The range of the concentration index is
defined by the range (−1, 1). A positive (negative) value
of concentration index indicates that the rich (poor)
contribute a larger proportion than the poor (rich). The
value of the index equals zero if everyone pays the same.
However, the value of the concentration index does not
denote whether a health care financing system is equit-
able or not, for it does not take the household income
(ATP) into consideration. Only if the proportion of
health care payments paid by the rich are not lower than
the share of income they received, or the proportion of
the payment paid by the poor is not higher than the
share of income they received, is the health care system
considered to have financing equity. The Kakwani index
cum % of household
Lcum
Lpay




Figure 1 Conceptual cumulative concentration curve for health care payment and income.
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tration index and the Gini coefficient, reflecting the
degree of progressivity of health care financing [37].
When the Kakwani index is positive (πk > 0), the health
care financing system is progressive, so that the Lorenz
curve of income (Linc) lies above the concentration curve
of payments (Lpay). When the Kakwani index is negative
(πk < 0), the system is regressive, so that the concentra-
tion curve of payments (Lpay) lies above the Lorenz
curve of income (Linc). When the Kakwani index equals
zero (πk = 0), it indicates that the system is proportional,
and therefore there is a coincidence of the Lorenz and
concentration payments curves. Furthermore, not only
can the Kakwani index quantify the degree of financing
equity in one certain area in a specific period, but it also
enables a comparison of the levels of progressivity at
different times and areas without consideration of their
different social-economic context for the reason that eco-
nomic status and health financing factors are included in
the model [38]. Thus, the differences of Kakwani index
among different regions or years can assess the inequality
gaps in areas and variations in times and, consequently,
evaluate the financing performance in equity due to differ-
ent policies in urban–rural areas or interventions at differ-
ent time intervals.
In addition, a dominance test is added to the progres-
sivity analysis. To establish whether the health care
financing reduces inequity, in the sense that lower
income individuals contribute a lesser share of financing
than the wealthy, compared with their living standards, a
test is conducted of whether the concentration curve
dominates (lies above) the Lorenz curve of household
expenditure. For the dominance tests, standard errors ofthe ordinates of curves and of differences in ordinates
are computed, allowing for dependence between curves
where appropriate [39,40]. A multiple comparison ap-
proach to testing is adopted [41,42], with the null
defined as curves being indistinguishable. This is tested
against both dominance and crossing of curves [43]. The
null is rejected in favor of dominance if there is at least
one significant difference between the ordinates of two
curves in one direction and no significant difference in
the other direction across 19 evenly spaced quintile
points from 0.05 to 0.95. The null is rejected in favor of
crossing if there is at least one significant difference in
each direction [44].
Results
Table 3 displays income quintile distributions of income
and sources of health care payments in two years (years
2002 and 2007) and two types of regions (urban and
rural areas), including the concentration index, the Gini
coefficient and the Kakwani index of health care pay-
ment. In addition, the table displays the differences of
Kakwani values in different areas and times.
In both 2002 and 2007, the values of concentration
indices were all positive, suggesting that the rich contrib-
uted a greater proportion of the health care payment
than the poor. In 2002, in both urban and rural regions,
almost all the values were higher than 0.4 except for the
rural public health insurance (0.3926). Compared to the
year 2002, all values in 2007 were nearly lower than 0.4
except for rural private health insurance (0.5936), espe-
cially the rural public health insurance (0.1966) that kept
a much lower level. Three findings were discovered on
the basis of the results of concentration indices. First, it













Q1 Poorest 5.51% 5.58% 1.94% 1.39% 4.92%
Q2 9.78% 9.90% 4.70% 3.37% 8.19%
Q3 14.74% 14.77% 14.42% 15.14% 13.71%
Q4 21.74% 21.64% 30.87% 27.06% 20.62%
Q5 Richest 48.23% 48.11% 48.08% 53.04% 52.56%
Gini/CI (SE) 0.4256*
(0.0112)
0.4232* (0.0113) 0.4998* (0.0263) 0.5110 (0.0597) 0.4711*
(0.0317)




Weight 0.1722 0.1716 0.0229 0.6333 1
Dominance
test
D+ X D- None
Rural (B)
Q1 Poorest 5.59% 5.85% 10.40% 8.34% 5.51%
Q2 10.25% 10.97% 7.62% 2.43% 9.07%
Q3 14.29% 15.39% 10.69% 5.74% 11.17%
Q4 18.39% 18.90% 23.98% 21.62% 18.67%
Q5 Richest 51.48% 48.88% 47.31% 61.87% 55.57%
Gini/CI (SE) 0.4541*
(0.0446)
0.4260* (0.0420) 0.3926 (0.1322) 0.5350 (0.0985) 0.4989*
(0.0495)




Weight 0.1722 0.1716 0.0229 0.6333 1
Dominance
test
D+ None None None
2007
Urban (C)
Q1 Poorest 7.42% 8.11% 3.84% 5.68% 5.90%
Q2 12.14% 12.40% 10.34% 7.18% 11.51%
Q3 16.98% 17.14% 17.49% 22.57% 16.24%
Q4 23.69% 23.75% 25.53% 33.79% 23.05%
Q5 Richest 39.77% 38.60% 42.79% 30.78% 43.30%
Gini/CI (SE) 0.3256**
(0.0044)
0.3078** (0.0044) 0.3917* (0.0105) 0.3345 (0.0598) 0.3743*
(0.0270)




Weight 0.2453 0.2339 0.0365 0.4843 1
Dominance
test
D+ D- None None
Rural (D)
Q1 Poorest 7.40% 7.68% 13.37% 1.08% 6.76%
Q2 12.17% 12.54% 14.89% 4.68% 10.87%
Q3 16.29% 16.32% 17.40% 10.02% 17.31%
Q4 22.50% 22.33% 22.63% 25.14% 24.57%
Q5 Richest 41.64% 41.13% 31.71% 59.08% 40.49%
Gini/CI (SE) 0.3402**
(0.0066)
0.3305** (0.0069) 0.1966* (0.0394) 0.5936 (0.0673) 0.3488*
(0.0234)
Kakwani - −0.0097** (0.0036) −0.1436* (0.0394) 0.2534 (0.0672) −0.0226
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Weight 0.2453 0.2339 0.0365 0.4843 1
Dominance
test




2002 (A-B) - 0.0257 0.1357 0.0045 0.0007 0.0283
Dominance
test
None None None None
2007 (C-D) - −0.0080 0.2097 −0.2445 0.0402 0.0576
Dominance
test
None D- None None
Δ(2007–2002)
Urban (C-A) - −0.0153 −0.0081 −0.0765 0.0033 −0.0080
Dominance
test
D+ D+ None D+
Rural (D-B) - 0.0184 −0.0821 0.1724 −0.0362 −0.0374
Dominance
test
D+ D+ None None
*Significant at 0.05.
**Significant at 0.01.
a Public health insurance in urban areas refers exclusively to BMI, and refers solely to NCMS in rural areas.
X indicates rejection of the null hypothesis that curves are indistinguishable in favor of curves crossing at the 5 percent significance level.
None indicates failure to reject the null hypothesis that curves are indistinguishable at the 5 percent significance level.
+/− indicates concentration curve dominates (is dominated by) the Lorenz curve or concentration curve in one year or area and dominates (is dominated by) the other
in another year or area.
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health care resources in China’s health care system.
Second, the values of the concentration indices in rural
public health insurance in both 2002 and 2007 were
typically lower than the values of other health care
financing channels at the same period. Third, the aver-
age level of the concentration indices in 2002 was higher
than that in 2007, indicating that more financing
burdens have been allocated to the low- and middle-
income individuals in the more recent year, although the
Gini coefficient has also decreased, which implies that
the rich-poor gap is narrowing.
However, the concentration index is not a standard to
judge financing equity but just a measurement to assess
which population accounts for a higher share of health
care resources in absolute terms. In order to evaluate the
financing distribution, the Kakwani index is employed to
estimate the degree of equity in health care financing
system.
In 2002, in both cities and villages, tax finance was
regressive, while the finances of private health insurance
and OOP payments were progressive. Unlike the pro-
gressivity consistency in urban and rural areas, public
health insurance presented opposite results in cities and
villages. In health care financing, insurance was progres-
sive in urban areas but regressive in rural areas. The
results indicate that, in both cities and villages, the health
care financing channels of private health insurance andOOP payments were equitable, whereas the financing
channel of taxes was not. In addition, fairness can be
reflected by the urban public health insurance, namely the
BMI. Nevertheless, it was not equitable in the rural public
health insurance, CMS. Generally, the overall Kakwani
index was 0.0431 in urban and 0.0148 in rural areas in
2002, while, in 2007, it was 0.0351 in urban and −0.0226
in rural areas. The classification of health care progressiv-
ity stayed the same in 2007. These results are observed
directly in Figure 2, where the Lorenz curve of income
and the concentration curve are plotted, giving a visual
sense of the progressivity of health care payments.
Based on the results of the dominance test, the concen-
tration curve of taxes dominated the Lorenz curve in each
year and area, indicating that the financing was not equal,
for the poor contributed a larger share of financing than
the better off through taxes, compared with the living
standard. With regard to public health insurance, compared
to household expenditure, the concentration curve of the
BMI crossed with the Lorenz curve in 2002, indicating that
the middle class contributed a greater share of financing
than the other income groups. However, the concentration
curve of CMS was indistinguishable from the Lorenz curve
in 2002. In 2007, the concentration curve of BMI showed a
reduction in inequality, whereas the concentration curve of
NCMS represented an increase in inequality. It is interest-
ing to note that the concentration curves of OOP payments
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Figure 2 Concentration curve of health care payments and income.
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http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/12/466were not inequality-reducing and were highly correlated
with the living standard.
Although the progressivity kept parallel levels between
2002 and 2007, improvement and setback could be found
in the health care financing system. The differences of
values of the Kakwani indices by regions and times are
shown in Table 3. First, a comparison of the difference
between urban and rural regions Showed that in the year
2002 (row A-B), the difference in tax financing (0.0257)
was positive, while the differences in public health insur-
ance (0.1357), private health insurance (0.0045) and OOP
(0.0007) finance were positive, although the difference of
the OOP Kakwani index almost equaled zero. In other
words, whatever the progressivity of health care financing,
compared to the rural areas, urban areas had better
performance. This finding was also demonstrated by the
difference (0.0283) in total progressivity in the health care
financing system between urban and rural areas. Similarly,
in 2007 (row C-D), the financing performance of taxes
and private health insurance in urban areas was inferior to
that in rural areas, especially the channel of private health
insurance for the higher gap between urban and rural
areas. On the contrary, public health insurance and OOP
payments did better in urban areas than rural areas. In
short, the difference in overall Kakwani index was 0.0576between urban and rural areas in 2007. The dominance
test showed that differences between urban and rural con-
centration curves were basically indistinguishable except
for public health insurance in 2007, where the NCMS
dominated BMI. It indicated that the BMI was more
inequality-reducing than the NCMS. Second, a compari-
son of the difference between 2002 and 2007 showed that
in urban areas (row C-A), the differences concerning taxes
(−0.0153) and public and private health insurance
(−0.0081 and −0.0765) were negative, indicating that
health care finances have retrogressed in recent years.
Conversely, the OOP payments have been making pro-
gress. Likewise, in rural areas (row D-B), taxes and private
health care finances made progress while the public health
care and OOP finances did not. However, the total differ-
ence between 2002 and 2007 was −0.0080 in urban areas
and −0.0374 rural areas. The dominance test showed that
the concentration curves in 2007 mainly dominated those
in 2002, which indicated that the poor contributed more
to financing the burden than the rich over the period.
Discussion
Did China’s health care reform work in terms of the
equity of health care financing? The short answer is that
this is still under way. The health care financing by
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to zero but negative, was slightly regressive in both
urban and rural areas in 2002 and 2007. This suggests
that the tax burden for health care funding was slightly
concentrated on the poor. Generally, it is universally
acknowledged that tax finance is a progressive channel
to fund health care, in both high and middle-income
countries [10]. Compared to developed countries, where
direct taxes account for the majority, the dominant part
of general taxes are the indirect taxes in China, which is
a pro-rich policy so that the better-off can transfer the
tax burden to the poor: in 2010, the value-added tax
(VAT), sales tax, and excise tax on specific goods such
as alcohol, tobacco, gasoline accounted for 52.35% [45].
High reliance on indirect taxes leads to a regressive
pattern through tax funding in the Chinese health care
financing system. Still, tax finance has made progress in
rural areas from 2002 to 2007 since an upturn of finan-
cing progressivity was noted (Table 3, row D-B). This
tendency was attributed to tax renovation by China’s
authorities, who have lowered the agricultural tax rate
and abolished some types of taxes in rural areas since
2005. The taxpayers are peasants, most of whom are
classified into the low-income group. It is suggested that,
for some indirect taxes where vulnerable individuals
bear more burden relative to their ability to pay, tax
reduction and abolition should be done to cope with this
financing inequity, especially given the context that
more financing liabilities have been transferred to the
low-income population in recent years.
The progressivity of public health insurance differed in
urban and rural areas. In cities, BMI was progressive,
while CMS (or NCMS) was regressive in villages. Be-
sides, the values of the Kakwani indices declined in both
urban and rural areas from 2002 to 2007. Evidence has
shown that public health insurance can be progressive
or regressive [46,47], and progressivity tends to be
decreased at the early stage in the transition to universal
coverage [5]. As mentioned above, China’s health sector
reform took the coverage expansion seriously and cov-
ered the uninsured with the current or new insurance
program. This led to the poor making more of a con-
tribution to public health insurance than they used to,
and consequently the value of the Kakwani index was
decreased. However, this is a secondary reason for the
decreased value of the Kakwani index. The more signifi-
cant reason for divergence between urban and rural
public insurance was the premium-setting policy. Both
the previous CMS and the current NCMS, have one
thing in common: the insured individuals are required to
pay the same premium in absolute terms, regardless of
their ability-to-pay. That is to say, earns less, pays equal.
This resulted in an inequitable financing outcome for
the NCMS. By contrast, persons who are covered in theBMI are required to pay a certain proportion of their
earnings as premiums. In other words, earns more, pays
more.
The OOP health care payment deserves more atten-
tion, not only because it accounts for the highest pro-
portion of total health care financing in China, but also
because it is a post-paid payment so that the identifica-
tion of its financing equity is unique compared to other
pre-paid payments. In some high-income countries or
nations with prominent social health care financing
systems, the poor households provide a larger share of
financing resources with OOP payment. By contrast, in
many low and middle economies, OOP payments are
progressive to ability-to-pay, indicating that the better-
off finance more of the funds [10]. In the common view,
developing countries tend to be more equitable than
developed ones in terms of OOP payment. However, as
a post-paid mechanism of payment, it adheres to the law
of who pays, who gets. In some developing countries,
OOP payment is not a challenge for the high-income
group in their consumption of medical goods or ser-
vices, even for higher quality care at higher prices,
whereas the low- and middle- income groups cannot
afford to seek medical service, even the most basic med-
ical treatment [48-51]. In our study, the OOP payments
were progressive in all situations. However, unlike the
progressive prepayment through taxation and public
health insurance which could shift funds from the rich
to the poor, progressive direct payment improved access
for the wealthy who financed healthcare for themselves.
Furthermore, we can see that urban areas had higher pro-
gressivity than rural ones in both 2002 and 2007, indicat-
ing the better-off in cities accounted for more health
resources, especially in 2007. On the other hand, from
2002 to 2007, the progressive tendency continued in cities
but not in villages, which indicated that the rural popula-
tion had a higher financing equity relative to the ability-
to-pay than the urban population in direct payment. In
aggregate, equity evaluation on OOP payment is not
judged by health care financing distribution alone but is
associated with health care utilization as well.
Financing equity is just one side of health care equity
and does not reflect the side of utilization. The analysis
of health care utilization considers whether the better-
off not only pay more but also receive more health care.
With pre-paid payment, we can infer whether the poor
enjoy more services or not since they are more inclined
to make a greater contribution relative to their ability to
pay. Different from the financing equity that is assessed
by the Kakwani index, the equity of utilization is judged
by the concentration index directly since an individual’s
need for health care utilization has nothing to do with
income [52]. The distribution of health care utilization
in Gansu province is estimated in Table 4.
Table 4 Concentration indices for health care utilization
in Gansu, China, 2002 and 2007
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for hospital care were positive, indicating that the rich
received a larger share of health care resources. Similarly
in 2007, the better-off absorbed a higher proportion
of care than the poor. It was suggested that for each
category of hospital care, there was basically a pro-rich
bias, which is consistent with our finding that OOP
payment was heavily relied upon by the high-income
group in Gansu province. In other word, the rich paid
more and receive more while the poor received less
because they simply could not afford medical expenses
and so sought no treatment. From 2002 to 2007, for the
increase of concentration index for each category of
urban hospital care, we tentatively put forward that
OOP payment played a dominant role in health care
payment and that other prepayments such as public
health insurance could not perform as well in improving
health care utilization. On the contrary, the concentra-
tion index for each category of rural hospital care has
fallen in recent years, which is attributed to the intro-
duction of NCMS, and more importantly, lower coinsur-
ance and more covered services that lead to the villagers
having more access to health care, especially to out-
patient care at lower prices. We believe that a health
insurance (e.g. BMI), even if it is financing equitable,
would not improve the extent of use of health care,
especially for the low-income group, if the policy’s goal
exclusively focused on the coverage rather than the
benefit package, such as lower copayment and deducti-
bles, more insured health care services, and so on.
However, our study primarily used data primarily prior
to the year 2007. China’s health care reform after 2007
has been affected by the CNY 850 billion Plan for the
health sector. Benefited by the additional government
spending, the average premiums of NCMS and URBMI
have increased from 58.9 RMB in 2007 to 230 RMB in
2011, and 100 RMB in 2007 to 300 RMB in 2011 [26],
respectively. More significantly, individual contributions
to premiums stayed the same over the period. The
increase of premium was financed exclusively from thecentral and state governments. Put differently, this has
narrowed the gap between the rich and the poor for the
individual’s proportion of the total premium. In addition,
more coverage for ambulatory care and further co-payment
reductions in priority diseases in the inpatient service
improves patient access to health care, especially for the
poor. Both measures might reduce inequality in health
financing and utilization.
Some limitations of our data must however be acknowl-
edged, because they may affect the interpretation of our
results and call for caution in their generalization as a
basis for informing the policy debate about healthcare
reforms in China.
One major limitation in our study is that it examined
one single province of China. It is not likely to fully rep-
resent national health care financing characteristics.
Notwithstanding this limitation, our study employed
percentages and indices to evaluate the implementation
of national policies and programs in a whole population.
Because of this feature, it is less linked with the provin-
cial economic level and its geographic location. To some
extent, a sub-national financing equity can reflect the
national financing distribution. We look forward to
cross-province comparisons of financing equity to be
conducted in the future. Although regional economic
development has been taken into consideration in our
research through using the Kakwani index, we cannot
say with certainty that the renovations implemented in
the health care financing system, for example, the expan-
sions of NCMS and BMI, have led to the observed
changes in progressivity. Other factors that are difficult
to control in our study, such as changes of geographic
access to health care, patient satisfaction, and awareness
of prevention, would influence financing progressivity.
This may be avoided in future studies, should another
similar socioeconomic province without similar health
policy interventions be collected as the control group,
using a difference-in-differences approach.
A limitation in data collection is that we used the finan-
cing distribution of indirect taxes to represent general tax
distribution, owing to the inaccessibility of data collection
for direct taxes in the household health interview surveys.
Although indirect taxes constitute the major part of
general taxes in China, it should be noted that progressiv-
ity of tax financing might be underestimated in our study,
considering the progressive effect of direct taxes. In
addition, a proxy for living standards was household
expenditures (per adult equivalence), which is likely to
understate the living standards of rural residents, for
household production cannot be neglected in these areas.
Last, our study focused on the period between 2002
and 2007. However, as discussed above, policy imple-
mented after 2007 has affected health care financing
already. A new round of household survey and analysis
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reform in further studies.
Conclusions
The theme of China’s health sector in the first decade of
21st century is the struggle for health care reform. Based
on our empirical study, we found that more low- and
middle-income households have begun to undertake a
higher proportion of the health care financing burden
compared to the past. On reason is that the economic gap
between the rich and the poor has narrowed. Another rea-
son is the outcomes of the measures launched by renova-
tions in the health sector. In health care financing reform,
general taxes are slightly pro-rich since the indirect taxes
account for the majority and are preferred by the better-
off. Based on a successful experience in rural areas, some
small-scale tax exemption, especially for those taxes that
concentrate on vulnerable groups, will play a large part in
equity improvement.
Both urban and rural health insurance have two sides:
the Basic Medical Insurance (BMI) does well in financing
equity but not for utilization; the New Rural Cooperative
Medical Scheme (NCMS) is not equitable in financing,
but the poor have more access to health services. Results
indicate that, by financing standards, BMI in cities is
evenly distributed while NCMS is not. However, the
equity performance is partially associated with the cover-
age. Key for health care reform is not only increasing the
number of the insured population but also optimizing the
benefit packages’ to broaden access to medical care for
more persons, especially for poor individuals. This also
explains why the rural areas had better utilization equity
than urban areas. Despite their flaws, BMI and NCMS did
improve financing equity and health utilization, respect-
ively. However, OOP payment still dominated as the
major part of total financing in the year 2007 (Table 1),
which limits the role played by the prepayment systems,
which account for a minor part of health care financing.
These results should inform strategies to adjust financing
policies and mechanisms under the current Chinese
health care reform effort.
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